August 8, 2016 – Fort Russ News –
– By Eduard Popov for Fort Russ – translated by J. Arnoldski
Today marks eight years since the beginning of the war known as “08/08/08” when Georgian troops invaded South Ossetia and attacked a Russian peacekeeping battalion. The events of the war are well known, so let me instead provide a few considerations on what this war meant in a larger context.
These considerations of mine were presented in a more general and academic form at a scholarly conference participated in by representatives from the governments of South Ossetia and Georgia as well as in a rather large scholarly article on the question of national sovereignty, one section of which was dedicated to the events of August 2008. Allow me to briefly restate these previously expressed ideas.
I’ll begin with what the 08/08/08 war was not. The attack by Georgian troops on South Ossetia was not a war between Georgia and “rebel territories” waged with the aim of “returning” them to a parent state. The participation of troops from a number of countries, including the US, made this war too large and significant for such an explanation to be true. The true enemy of Saakashvili and those forces standing behind him was not a “separatist” government Tskhinvali, but Russia. Hence why strikes were consciously launched not only on the civilian population of South Ossetia, but on the Russian peacekeeping battalion.
This insidious and bloody attack was even less of a war between Orthodox Georgia and Orthodox Russia as some ideologues of Georgian militarism were quick to posit. It is unfortunately that the incorrect term “Russian-Georgian War” has become customary in Russia. George and South Ossetia were too small of reasons for any attack on Russia.
The war of August 2008 was an avant-garde war initiated by the West against a drastically weakened Russia confined to its national borders. Georgian militarism served as the vanguard of the West, while the territory of South Ossetia and Georgia was this war’s bridgehead.
Today, Donbass is such a stronghold, while the Kiev regime plays the role of the obedient anti-Russian weapon of the West. Russia won the first avant-garde war, and it will win the second one on the territory of former Ukraine.
There is yet another important conclusion. Eight years have passed since the 08/08/08 war, since which relations between Russia and Georgia, and especially between Russians and Georgians, have drastically changed. Restoring relations with the population of former Ukraine, largely poisoned by Ukrainian neo-Nazism and Russophobia, will be much more difficult and require much more time. Nevertheless, sooner or later this will happen. Victory in this war would leave Russia to face tasks of planetary scale. One of them is establishing a union of Orthodox peoples and countries (a new Byzantine project), and the other is offering the world a new project for a new system, a project for social justice and respect for the cultural diversity of humanities’ societies. Today’s Russia is still a junior partner in the liberal club, but the time has come to cast off the spiritual and political chains of liberalism and restore the principle of national sovereignty.